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TARGETED KILLINGS—NEVER NOT AN 
ACT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL  
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
BARRY KELLMAN* 
Abstract: Defenders of targeted killings proffer a straightforward elaboration of 
military necessity in the context of modern technological capabilities and con-
clude that killing members of terrorist organizations is legal under international 
law. In this essay, I assert that targeted killings to combat terrorist threats should 
not be governed predominantly by the law of war but should be synthesized with 
widely recognized principles of international criminal justice. Targeted killings 
are now the only aspect of counter-terrorism policy that operates outside con-
straints of criminal justice and beyond judicial review. That many people are be-
ing killed without anything like due process of law undermines the pursuit of 
strategies to strengthen law enforcement’s role in global counter-terrorism. A 
targeted killing is never not an act of criminal law enforcement and therefore 
must be governed by a foundational commitment to the primacy of criminal jus-
tice in defeating threats of terrorism. 
INTRODUCTION 
Targeted killings1 are among the most significant matters in international 
law at this time, a topic of substantial public and academic controversy.2 De-
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 *Professor of Law and Director of the International Weapons Control Center, DePaul University 
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 1 According to Philip Alston: 
The means and methods of killing vary, and include sniper fire, shooting at close range, 
missiles from helicopters, gunships, drones, the use of car bombs, and poison. The 
common element in all these contexts is that lethal force is intentionally and deliberate-
ly used, with a degree of pre-meditation, against an individual or individuals specifical-
ly identified in advance by the perpetrator. In a targeted killing, the specific goal of the 
operation is to use lethal force. This distinguishes targeted killings from . . . law en-
forcement operations. 
Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), Study on Tar-
geted Killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, at 4–5 (May 28, 2010). 
 2 See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., GLOBAL OPINION OF OBAMA SLIPS, INTERNATIONAL POLICIES 
FAULTED (2012), www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/chapter-1-views-of-the-u-s-and-american-foreign-
policy-4/#drones [https://perma.cc/547Y-V58A]. Many legal scholars debate clarification of interna-
tional legal norms. See Thomas Byron Hunter, Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the 
War on Terrorism, 2 J. STRATEGIC SECURITY 1, 1 (2009); Michael Ramsden, Assessing U.S. Targeted 
Killings Under an International Human Rights Law Framework, 1 GRONINGEN J. INT’L L. 19, 19 
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fenders of the practice advance a thesis entirely derived from the law of war to 
conclude that killing members of terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates and successors, is legal under international law.3 The United 
States and its allies, having suffered unjustifiable attacks, having reason to an-
ticipate more attacks, and having properly authorized the use of force, may 
assert the right of national defense to allow killing of members of designated 
terrorist organizations. At the core of this argument is a straightforward elabo-
ration of military necessity in the context of modern technological capabili-
ties.4 
According to one leading expert, “while terrorists are always criminals,” 
and to target terrorists in the United States and other nations having effective law 
enforcement systems would not be necessary and appropriate,5 targeting persons 
associated with designated terrorist organizations in other places, “may be lawful 
as well as the only practical course.”6 As sniping members of designated organi-
zations is legal within the scope of the law of war, it matters not whether the 
weapon used is a rifle or an armed drone—a mere question of means of warfare. 
So long as the instrument is not one of a handful of treaty-banned weapons, in-
ternational law is broadly unconcerned. 
                                                                                                                           
(2013); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The International Law of Drones, ASIL INSIGHTS (Nov. 12, 2010), 
www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/issue/37/international-law-drones [perma.cc/KX7E-XKC9]. For a 
discussion of the debate on international drone use norms in targeted killings and whether those norms 
will either reinforce or constrict U.S. use of drones, see Sierra Rayne, Debate Emerging Over Interna-
tional Norms for Drone Use, AM. THINKER (May 14, 2015), www.americanthinker.com/blog/2015/
05/debate_emerging_over_international_norms_for_drone_use.html [https://perma.cc/8859-JMX9]. 
 3 See Nicholas Rostow, The Laws of War and the Killing of Suspected Terrorists: False Starts, 
Rabbit Holes, and Dead Ends, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1215, 1222, 1231 (2011). On terminology: (1) 
like Professor Rostow, I prefer the term “law of war” instead of the more vacuous “law of armed con-
flict” and (2) like Professor Rostow, I generally limit analysis here to targeted killing of non-
Americans; the case of Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (involving the targeting 
of an American) is discussed infra. 
 4 By this logic, the words “necessary” and “appropriate” within the Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force (AUMF) signify that the military instrument is limited to situations where police ac-
tion, by the United States or the state in which the terrorist is located, is impossible. In states unable or 
unwilling to take action to prevent their territories from being used by terrorists, a use of force may be 
lawful as the only practicable course. Rostow, supra note 3, at 1219. Professor Paust has argued that 
“selective use of armed force in self-defense is not simplistically ‘law enforcement,’” but more aptly 
is an act of self-defense. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permis-
sibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237, 249–50 (2010). But the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, has concluded that reli-
ance on the exceptional self-defense argument under Article 51 in support of targeted killings “would 
diminish hugely the value of the foundational prohibition contained in Article 51.” Alston, supra note 
1, at 13. 
 5 Nicholas Rostow, Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 74 JOINT FORCE Q. 98, 98 (2014). Professor 
Rostow notes that Congress used these words in the AUMF to “limit the use of the military instrument 
to those situations where police action, by the United States or the state in which the terrorist is found, 
is impossible.” Id. at 99. 
 6 Id. at 99. 
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In this essay, I assert that targeted killings to combat contemporary terror-
ist threats should not be governed predominantly by the law of war, but should 
be synthesized with widely recognized principles of international criminal jus-
tice. My objection is not with application of the law of war to targeted killing, 
but to the implicit proposition that only the law of war need be applied. With 
respect to advocates of current targeted killing practices, there is more twixt 
heaven and earth than is dreamt of in your philosophy. 
Not long ago, the legality of targeted killings was something of an arcane 
topic, if only because of the sheer rarity of accomplishing the deed. But the 
technological advances associated with armed drones take targeted killings 
from the exception to the weekly (at least) reality. Three states—the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Israel—have used armed drones for targeted kill-
ing. The majority of such strikes have been by the United States outside battle-
field domains (Iraq and Afghanistan), in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia; no end 
is in sight.7 
In this writer’s view, international law does not deny a state the right to 
use military force to disrupt, degrade, and ultimately defeat terrorist threats to 
the security of its citizens, property, or interests. Accordingly, there would 
seem to be no basis for a per se prohibition on targeted killing at this time. But 
killing a terrorist target may be a pyrrhic victory from which more antagonism 
is often bred.8 More centrally, a targeted killing of terrorists is never not an act 
of criminal law enforcement and therefore must be governed by essential prin-
ciples of international criminal justice. Accordingly, resort to the law of war’s 
justifications for the use of force outside the scope of international criminal 
law must be desisted. 
My thesis is this: Law enforcement tends to reduce violence; the use of 
military force, even if initially justified, tends to self-perpetuate, even metasta-
size into more violence. Accordingly, law enforcement offers the only long-run 
                                                                                                                           
 7 On the legal implications of an eventual end to the war on terror, see Steve Vladeck, Has the Gov-
ernment Conceded That Courts Can Review Detainees’ End-of-War Claims?, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 30, 
2015, 1:11 PM), http://justsecurity.org/22586/governments-implicit-concession-end-of-hostilities-claims-
justiciable/ [https://perma.cc/F9KF-JJ7M]. 
 8 See Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3–5, 7 (2013) (statement of Farea Al-Muslimi), www.judiciary.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/04-23-13Al-MuslimiTestimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GGF-CFXP]; INT’L CRISIS 
GRP., DRONES: MYTHS AND REALITY IN PAKISTAN 25, 34 (2013), www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/
Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/247-drones-myths-and-reality-in-pakistan.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK4J-
N29T]; INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC, STANFORD LAW SCH. & GLOB. JUS-
TICE CLINIC, NYU SCH. OF LAW, LIVING UNDER DRONES: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS 
FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN 73–101 (2012), http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/10/Living-Under-Drones.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BNK-FVQJ]; Akbar Nasir Khan, The US’ Policy 
of Targeted Killings by Drones in Pakistan, 11 ISLAMABAD POL’Y RES. INST. J. 21, 22–24, 33–34 
(2011). 
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successful strategy for defeating terrorism.9 The tactics of warfare should be 
acceptable only in the rarest of cases when law enforcement tools are unavail-
ing. International law imposes obligations on all states, especially states that 
use force, to strengthen these tools, especially now. 
At this time, targeted killings are the act which all international lawyers 
should be most self-conscious about, the only aspect of counter-terrorism poli-
cy that operates outside constraints of criminal justice and beyond judicial re-
view. That many people are being killed without anything like due process of 
law undermines pursuit of strategies to strengthen law enforcement’s role in 
global counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism strategies might better focus on 
how to adapt law enforcement to terrorism’s unique challenges than to relegate 
authority over killing terrorists to military and intelligence communities. 
Thus, to satisfy international law, a program of targeted killing should sat-
isfy three core criteria: 
 1) The selection of people for killing should entail judicial intervention, 
very carefully crafted to respect the government’s security impera-
tives, so as to ensure that there is a strong evidentiary basis that an 
individual poses a significant risk of committing serious crimes; 
 2) Targeted killings should be exclusively a last resort in favor of bring-
ing culprits to criminal justice, and the obligation to arrest entails 
positive responsibilities for strengthening capacities for apprehen-
sion and prosecution; and 
 3) Claims related to innocent casualties should be justiciable because 
legal accountability is essential to minimizing such casualties. 
These three propositions must be presented sequentially, but they are best 
conceived as three mutually reinforcing pillars upon which a policy of targeted 
killing under law should stand. 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated: 
[W]e should all be clear that there is no trade-off between effective action against ter-
rorism and the protection of human rights. On the contrary, I believe that in the long 
term, we shall find that human rights, along with democracy and social justice, are one 
of the best prophylactics against terrorism. 
Press Release, Security Council, Secretary-General, Addressing Council Meeting on Counter-
Terrorism, Says United Nations ‘Stands Four-Square’ Against Scourge, U.N. Press Release SC/7277 
(Jan. 18, 2002). Said the Israeli Supreme Court: “The power of society to stand against its enemies is 
based on its recognition that it is fighting for values that deserve protection.” HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. 
IDF Commander 56(6) PD 352, ¶ 41 (2002) (Isr.) (quoting HCJ 168/91 Morcos v. Minister of Def. 
45(1) PD 467, 470 (Isr.)). 
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I. SELECTION OF PERSONS FOR TARGETED KILLING—THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
An analysis of how persons are selected for killing might usefully begin 
by asking whether these persons are criminal suspects or enemy combatants.10 
The premise of targeted killings is that such persons are combatants against 
whom the use of force has been legally authorized under national and interna-
tional law. Unlike criminal suspects who are entitled to legal protections in-
cluding the presumption of innocence and the right to be heard before punish-
ment is inflicted, and who certainly may not be blasted by an armed drone, 
terrorists are most certainly not presumed innocent and therefore are subject to 
the use of lethal force by virtue of their status. 
This assertion, however, is only half true. Terrorists are, of course, crimi-
nals. Murder, kidnapping for ransom, and infrastructure destruction are crimi-
nal acts everywhere. Moreover, as there is often strong collaboration between 
terrorist organizations and narco-criminals, human traffickers, and weapons 
proliferators, it would be unsound to distinguish terrorists from other crimi-
nals.11 Unlike traditional combatants, terrorists wear no uniforms nor typically 
self-identify according to the mores of battlefield behavior. Hiding within 
modern means of telecommunications and striking at vulnerable civilians, the 
terrorist is the precise opposite of a soldier. Whatever legal respect should be 
afforded to combatants, even enemy combatants, has not and should not be 
afforded to terrorists.12 Significantly, counter-terrorism is less about vanquish-
ing an enemy’s forces than about the typical criminal concepts of punishment: 
retribution, deterrence, interdiction, and pre-emption. 
Yet terrorists are, in important respects, not like other criminals. The 
threat that terrorists pose is more horrific, and more destructive of personal, 
national, and global security. Throughout the world is an endlessly morphing 
yet continuous strain of violence that poses a direct, life-threatening, and unde-
terrable danger, ideologically founded on destruction of modern societies that 
they find despicable. Motivated not by revenge or greed, but by seeking to 
spread fear throughout the community, terrorists pose a danger very different 
from ordinary criminals who rely on the continued vitality of the societies 
from which they pillage. And terrorists’ apparent willingness to use any and all 
                                                                                                                           
 10 For a fuller discussion of how the Bush administration used the war on terror to determine which 
groups of people targeted killing is acceptable for, see Kenneth Roth, Drawing the Line: War Rules and 
Law Enforcement Rules in the Fight Against Terrorism, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2004), www.hrw.
org/legacy/wr2k4/download/9.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ53-UMUL]. 
 11 For a fuller discussion of the numerous examples of intimate connections terrorist organiza-
tions have with criminal organizations to achieve certain objectives, see JOHN ROLLINS ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41004, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: SECURITY 
THREATS, U.S. POLICY, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS (2010). 
 12 See Wesley K. Clark & Kal Raustiala, Why Terrorists Aren’t Soldiers, INT’L HERALD TRIB. 
(Aug. 8, 2007), http://www2.law.ucla.edu/raustiala/publications/Why%20terrorists%20aren’t%20
soldiers.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWK8-YBGX]. 
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means of violence, including chem-bio and perhaps nuclear weapons, means 
that terror threats are inherently global in scope. It is not that terrorists are 
more inherently evil than genocidal heads-of-state, more depraved than human 
traffickers, or more ultimately destructive than weapons proliferators. What 
makes terrorists distinctive among criminals is that their danger is explicitly to 
the stability and security of civilized order. 
We are instructed that law offers only a bipolar option: a terrorist must be 
either a criminal or a combatant. Great legal minds have attested to there being 
no third category.13 But law, however brilliantly framed, cannot make some-
thing that it is not, and terrorists are not either criminals or combatants but a 
combination of both. Manifestly, the world’s leaders have not yet developed a 
hybrid framework for addressing these threats—indeed have resisted its devel-
opment.14 In such a frameless context, to analyze the international legality of 
targeted killings represents a challenge of trying to pound a square peg into the 
intersection of two round holes. 
My critique here is with the asserted justification for targeted killings 
based on the premise that rightful authorization of the use of force is sufficient 
to justify targeted killings; the target’s individual criminal responsibility is 
without legal significance. According to this justification, if authorization of 
force is legal, then military or intelligence officials have exclusive responsibil-
ity to determine who should be targeted. But as terrorists are both criminals 
and combatants, this logic is at best incomplete. 
The logic’s flaw is manifest in the very term, targeted killing. Under the 
law of war, the personal culpability of a combatant is essentially irrelevant, 
tactically subjugated to the us-versus-them prerogatives of military necessity 
and therefore outside legal inquiry. A soldier shoots an adversary, and the law 
does not impose much obligation to know who gets the bullet. The all-
                                                                                                                           
 13 The Israeli Supreme Court noted the “expert opinion” of Professor Cassese for the proposition 
that “[t]hose who do not fall into the category of combatants are, by definition, civilians. There is no 
third category of ‘unlawful combatants.’” HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of 
Isr. 62(1) PD 507, ¶ 7 (2006) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.
a34.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7G9-RQR2]; see ANTONIO CASSESE, EXPERT OPINION ON WHETHER 
ISRAEL’S TARGETED KILLINGS OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS IS CONSONANT WITH INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 20, https://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/cassese.pdf [https://web.archive.org/
web/20151210231513/http://stoptorture.org.il/files/cassese.pdf]. 
 14 See Gregory E. Maggs, Assessing the Legality of Counterterrorism Measures Without Charac-
terizing Them as Law Enforcement or Military Action, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 661, 665 (2007) (“Terrorists, 
and counterterrorism efforts, generally defy simple characterization into one category or another be-
cause terrorists resemble enemy combatants in some ways and criminal suspects in others.”); see also 
Michael L Gross, Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement, Execution or Self-Defence?, 
23 J. APPLIED PHIL. 323, 332–34 (2006); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: 
Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 180, 182, 190–
204 (2005); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 343, 347, 352–53 (2010); Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibility, 
and the Use of Military Force, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 97, 98–99 (2003). 
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important question is whether force is properly authorized. If so, any particular 
adversary, by becoming a combatant, forfeits his right to life and is vulnerable 
to the infliction of lethal force. Indeed, at the heart of the concept of military 
necessity is the adversary’s personal anonymity and moral neutrality. His iden-
tity is confined to his combatant status. 
But the whole idea of targeted killing is that the identity of the specific 
terrorist does matter; it is his identity and behavior that justifies the use of 
force. Debates about whether a state may have legal authority to pursue coun-
ter-terrorism measures entailing the use of force, even lethal force are, there-
fore, not centrally relevant. What is at issue with targeted killings is whether 
the process for selecting persons for authorized countermeasures is legally suf-
ficient.15 The tolerance for battlefield combat inherent in the law of war is 
based on the idea that combatants are impersonal targets, but today’s and to-
morrow’s targeted killings of terrorists are very personal. 
This first part of my argument considers how terrorists are selected for 
killing and whether the selection process satisfies international standards of 
criminal justice. The answer here should hinge on the judicial role within that 
process. Simply offered, selection of terrorists for actions affecting their fun-
damental human rights, e.g., their life, should entail a role for the judiciary, and 
the absence of any judicial role cannot satisfy these standards. The argument 
proceeds through two sections. In Section A, I focus on the risk of misidentifi-
cation and argue that this risk is unique with regard to modern terrorism for 
various reasons. Key here is the role of intelligence communities in making 
selection decisions. In Section B, I argue that international law has rejected the 
idea that authorization of the use of military force is sufficiently specific to 
justify the killing of most terrorists, and I call for a process of judicial interven-
tion as a prerequisite for targeted killings. 
A. The Risk of Misidentification and the Unique Role of  
Intelligence in Targeted Killings 
A primary concern about targeted killings is the risk that someone might 
be misidentified. In the United States, intelligence is analyzed among civilian 
and military agencies to consider whether elimination of a person will disrupt, 
even temporarily, the terrorist organization’s decision-making processes and 
networks.16 Targets are surveilled, both visually and financially, and linkages 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets All Out of Proportion, 45 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 235, 247 (2012) (“Targeted killing rests on the specific identification of individu-
als who pose an imminent threat to the state’s national security and are, therefore, legitimate targets 
within the framework of lawful self-defense. The state thus needs a method and a process for figuring 
out who poses a threat, why they pose a threat, and how that threat can be deterred or eliminated.”). 
 16 See David Kaye, International Law Issues in the Department of Justice White Paper on Tar-
geted Killing, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 15, 2013), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/8/
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are drawn among sites and persons with whom they interact, generating a net-
work diagram that reveals key nodes where an attack can maximally impact 
the organization.17 “The effects sought by killing are not merely the immediate 
effects of eliminating a person, but also the second- and third-order effects 
such as pressuring, desynchronizing, and debilitating the effectiveness of ter-
rorist networks.”18 
A formal and reiterative inter-agency process, managed by the National 
Counterterrorism Center, allows multiple officials to vet concerns about the 
target’s identification and significance, estimates of collateral damage, and 
possible jeopardy of intelligence sources.19 Throughout, the intelligence that is 
the basis for selection as well as the strategic and tactical implications of con-
ducting a strike are vetted and validated.20 Significant consideration is given to 
how the strike may impact diplomatic relations and the extent to which an at-
tack might generate local or international antagonism.21 Moreover, senior State 
Department, military, and intelligence lawyers participate by offering legal 
opinions of the strike’s merits and implications. The ultimate decision to strike 
a target may be made by the President, but in other cases may be made by sen-
ior intelligence or military officials.22 
Notably, this process, while manifesting great care, has little similarity to a 
determination of criminal guilt by a court of law. Criminal law, obviously, makes 
many more fine distinctions with regard to how force is used than does the law 
of war. Gradations of suspicion are fundamental to the execution of police, pros-
ecutorial, or judicial responsibilities. A hunch is different from a reasonable sus-
picion, which is different from probable cause for arrest, which is different from 
finding someone guilty of an offense. While terminology differs among law en-
forcement systems worldwide, every system known to this writer manifests 
recognition of the different shadings of belief in a person’s culpability. 
                                                                                                                           
international-law-issues-department-justice-white-paper-targeted-killing [https://perma.cc/ARS5-
98GW]. 
 17 Four factors are considered: (1) value of the individual to the group’s ability to conduct opera-
tions, (2) time between the target’s elimination and its impact on the enemy system, (3) time required 
for the system to recoup its functional capability, and (4) the capacity of the system to inflict harm. 
See WALTER L. SHARP, DIR. OF THE JOINT STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-60: JOINT TARGETING app. 
D, at 2–4 (2007). 
 18 Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 711–12 (2014). 
 19 Id. at 727–29. 
 20 Id. at 708. 
 21 Id. at 727–31. For a discussion of the consequences of U.S. drone warfare in the Middle East as 
a study on how such counter-terror operations complicate U.S. policy in such regions, see Leila Hud-
son et al., Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War, 18 MIDDLE EAST POL’Y 
122 (2011). 
 22 See Gregory S. McNeal, Obama’s Kill List Story a Self Serving Campaign Piece Built from 
Selective Leaks, FORBES (June 8, 2012), www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2012/06/08/obama-kill-
listleaks/227 [https://perma.cc/AQQ4-SJ3U]. 
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Such considerations, however, are shrunk in the process that selects ter-
rorists for killing. This is a process of winnowing; anyone may be a potential 
target until intelligence suggests reasons why it is not worth killing them. 
Membership in a designated terrorist organization might suffice for a targeting, 
but a non-member could in unique circumstances be included, especially in 
light of how terrorist organizations mutate, forming and deforming associa-
tions over time. Even if the target’s affiliation with the terrorist organization is 
correctly identified, he might be a low-level functionary, an intimidated “sup-
porter” of an organization without sincere commitment, or he could be con-
templating, unbeknownst to his remote attackers, how to end whatever associa-
tion with terrorism he has had.23 
Such ambiguities are resolved entirely within the military or intelligence 
bureaucracies, isolated from judicial oversight and shielded from NGO or me-
dia intrusion. The risk here is that ambiguity about what is a “senior operation-
al leader” combined with a disregard of the imminence of the threat “creates a 
slippery slope that inevitably results in the deaths of otherwise innocent indi-
viduals . . . . If everyone who constitutes ‘them’ is automatically a legitimate 
target, then careful analysis of threats, imminence, proportionality, credibility, 
reliability, and other factors become meaningless. Self-defense becomes a man-
tra that justifies all action, regardless of method or procedure.”24 
This is where attention must be given to the sheer numbers of targeted 
killings. According to the most recent information from the Bureau of Investi-
gative Journalism, in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia (which are not battlefield 
domains and where intelligence officials, not the military, have authority over 
targeted killings) the United States has conducted 764 to 872 attacks that have 
taken at least 4031 and as many as 6477 lives, including 620 to 1316 civilians, 
of which more than 200 were children.25 The total number of casualties due to 
targeted attacks far exceeds the comparable number in Afghanistan, which the 
United States has viewed as an active combat domain for more than a decade 
and where the highest estimate of civilians killed is 200 and of children killed 
is forty-nine.26 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive 
Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 699 (2010). 
 24 Guiora, supra note 15, at 254, 256 (analogizing the problem here to the interrogation excesses 
that occurred in the wake of the Bybee Memo). 
 25 These numbers are cumulative of strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia and, for Yemen and 
Somalia, unconfirmed drone strikes or other covert activities. See Get the Data: Drone Wars, BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-
graphs/ [https://perma.cc/33PY-KNP2]; see also Micah Zenko, America’s 500th Drone Strike, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 21, 2014), http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2014/11/21/americas-500th-drone-strike/ 
[https://perma.cc/RC49-5CRF]. 
 26 See Get the Data: Drone Wars, supra note 25. 
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An obvious problem is that no government conducting targeted killings 
has accurately reported the number of terrorists killed, much less the number 
of civilians or children killed.27 Here is a catch-22: governments claim that 
targeted killings are conducted against only rightful targets, but it is impossible 
to disprove this assertion without access to data that the government refuses to 
provide. Relevant here is that the United States may over-classify victims as 
terrorists, counting all adult men within the target’s vicinity as his associates.28 
Any notion that targeted killings outside battlefield domains are isolated 
and about Bin Laden and merely a few other of humanity’s worst examples is 
belied by these numbers. More to the point, it would seem to need no citation 
to suggest that a process which leads to the killing of 200 children is a process 
that must be scrutinized for any logical flaw. 
That logical flaw is to invoke the law of war on behalf of operations co-
ordinated by intelligence officials who have a long history of confidence in 
their situational knowledge, which, while often well-founded, occasionally 
proves fallacious. There may have been a sincere misjudgment, a faulty trans-
mission of information, or an institutional bias that infected the decisional met-
rics. Terrorist identification is often based on human intelligence—snitches—
who may have ulterior motives for implying that an adversary carries sympa-
thies for radical causes.29 Such “Hum-Int” would rarely, if ever, satisfy legal 
standards for conviction of any crime. In any event, someone might be killed 
who did not do what his executioners believed, or at least did not deserve to 
die. Subsequent rectification of the loss is, of course, impossible. 
In an important sense, the distinction between law enforcement governed 
by principles of criminal justice and military force governed by the law of war 
is superseded by the fact that targeted killings outside battlefield theatres—i.e., 
in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia—proceed under the authority of intelligence 
agency officials.30 For this reason alone, the legal justification of military ne-
cessity for these targeted killings would seem awry as these killings are, literal-
                                                                                                                           
 27 REPRIEVE, YOU NEVER DIE TWICE: MULTIPLE KILLS IN THE US DRONE PROGRAM 10 (2014), 
https://www.reprieve.org/uploads/2/6/3/3/26338131/2014_11_24_pub_you_never_die_twice_-_multiple_
kills_in_the_us_drone_program.pdf [https://perma.cc/48BK-G8RU]. 
 28 See id. at 6. 
 29 For an in-depth analysis of the intelligence flaws that have, in fact, infiltrated the target selec-
tion process, see ANDREW COCKBURN, KILL CHAIN: THE RISE OF THE HIGH-TECH ASSASSINS 99–
117 (2015). 
 30 While the CIA has been most associated with targeted killings, the Washington Post has reported 
that the NSA has also been extensively involved. Greg Miller et al., Documents Reveal NSA’s Extensive 
Involvement in Targeted Killing Program, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-
program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html [https://perma.cc/8TT2-
MFT5] (“To handle the expanding workload, the NSA created a secret unit known as the Counter-
Terrorism Mission Aligned Cell, or CT MAC, to concentrate the agency’s vast resources on hard-to-
find terrorism targets.”). 
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ly, the actions of covert agents who, under the law of war, are themselves not 
lawful combatants, operating outside the combatant versus combatant logic of 
the law of war as spies and saboteurs. 
The history of the CIA’s involvement in targeted killing traces back to the 
early Cold War, from sabotaging Fidel Castro’s cigars, to well-known plots 
(some successful) against identified national security threats, including Iranian 
Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lu-
mumba, and Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. There is an unbroken chain of 
experience and logic that connects these schemes to today’s targeted killing of 
terrorists.31 In each case, the heinousness of the target may have been widely 
appreciated, and certainly the risk of misidentification was low. But few inter-
national lawyers would propound the legality of these often fatal, sometimes 
laughable, attempts to promote national security by killing someone. 
What is different now is not the national security imperative evoked to 
justify these killings; what has changed is the technological capacity to suc-
cessfully accomplish the mission. Yesterday’s covert targeted killings were 
hard to execute, requiring significant planning, offering little chance of suc-
cess, and likely putting our personnel at substantial risk. But armed drones 
make yesterday’s hard-to-do killing far less challenging and never dangerous 
to attacking personnel. These are not just another type of missile delivery sys-
tem but a weapon that enables a remote attacker to match intelligence about 
the terrorist with real-time surveillance in order to make the kill, offering a 
near one hundred percent chance of destroying the target, whether the target is 
or is not the suspected culprit. 
Moreover, armed drones auger a very imminent future when technologi-
cal advances will enable individuals to be killed with remarkable accuracy vir-
tually anywhere on Earth,32 literally without knowing what hit them and entire-
ly without due process. Looking forward, automated drones will be superseded 
by autonomous (robotic) weapons that search for and eventually kill a very 
specific individual.33 It is not difficult to anticipate a technological capacity for 
killing individuals that is the epitome of precision. 
                                                                                                                           
 31 For analysis on how the military and intelligence communities have focused on targeted kill-
ings for national security interests, see COCKBURN, supra note 29, at 99–117. 
 32 See Derek Gregory, The Everywhere War, 177 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 238, 247 (2011). 
 33 For discussions of the legality of autonomous weapon systems under the laws of armed con-
flict, see Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, in 
HANDBOOK OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (Kimon P. Valavanis & George J. Vachtsevanos eds., 
2015) (discussing the guidelines that apply to the use of military robots and the potential of codes of 
conduct to address important policy considerations); Kenneth Anderson et al., Adapting the Law of 
Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 386, 386, 388, 390–91 (2014), 
http://stockton.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=ils [https://perma.cc/KPP7-
MR6M] (asserting that autonomous weapon systems are not inherently illegal or unethical and offer-
ing a three-tiered approach to resolving challenges raised by the law of armed conflict); Jack M. 
Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 617, 633 (2014), 
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In sum, many targeted killings are based on selection information of per-
haps dubious quality, assessed by officials who are the least accountable of all 
parts of government, and undertaken by technology that poses almost no risk 
either of failure or of harm to the attackers. Here is a system for making deci-
sions literally of life and death significance that operates entirely outside of the 
processes and prescriptions of international criminal justice, calling into serious 
question states’ commitment to governance under law. 
B. The Obligation of Judicial Intervention in the Selection of  
Terrorists for Targeted Killing 
As selection of terrorists for targeted killing is personal, the process for 
their selection necessarily must entail legal protections—protections that are 
not satisfied by the authorization of the use of force against traditional combat-
ants. My brief in this section is not about the injustice of any specific selection 
and certainly does not attribute wrongful intent or recklessness to persons re-
sponsible for selections. Nor would I concur with various legal experts who 
call for reconsideration of how various jus ad bellum standards should apply to 
the target selection process. 34 
My brief is based on the proposition that killing—the gravest injury that 
can be done to a mortal human—is never not an act of international criminal 
justice, and therefore must engage the judiciary, independent of the intelligence 
and military chains of command. This proposition is supported by recent case 
law from the world’s leading tribunals attesting to the legal difference between 
                                                                                                                           
www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00314000617.PDF [https://
perma.cc/6ARF-B24Q] (an analysis of state accountability for autonomous weapons in view of inter-
national legal obligations to exercise human judgment in regard to protecting civilians in armed con-
flicts); Benjamin Kastan, Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Coming Legal “Singularity”?, 2013 J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 45, 52–53 (2013), http://illinoisjltp.com/journal/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Kastan.
pdf [https://perma.cc/F2KK-A2YX] (applying legal principles to the development of autonomous 
military robots); Michael A. Newton, Back to the Future: Reflections on the Advent of Autonomous 
Weapons Systems, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 5, 6, 21 (2015), http://scholarlycommons.law.case.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=jil [https://perma.cc/6DR7-434E] (considering the 
potentially salutary effects of autonomous weapons systems and concluding that a ban would not 
advance humanitarian goals); Jens David Ohiln, The Combatant’s Stance: Autonomous Weapons on 
the Battlefield, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 1–2 (2016), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=2584&context=facpub [https://perma.cc/Q9F3-RAZF] (arguing that military commanders 
can and should be held responsible for unleashing an automatic weapons system that commits a war 
crime); Heather M. Roff, The Strategic Robot Problem: Lethal Autonomous Weapons in War, 13 J. 
MIL. ETHICS 211, 211–13 (2014), www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15027570.2014.975010 
[https://perma.cc/6BAX-FKXN] (asserting the need to look to the targeting process to fully under-
stand the consequences of creating or fielding lethal autonomous robots). 
 34 See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora & Monica Hakimi, A Legal Framework for Targeted Killing in PA-
TRIOTS DEBATE: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 161, 164–67, 169–71, 177 
(Harvey Rishikof et al. eds., 2012). 
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authorization of counter-terrorism powers and selection of a target against 
whom such powers are exercised. 
For example, in the joint Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
cases35, the European Court of Justice rejected financial restrictions imposed 
by the Council of Europe to implement Security Council sanctions against 
funding the Taliban or Al Qaeda; such restrictions, held the court, deprived 
defendants of their legal rights.36 The court conceded that it did not have au-
thority to review the Security Council’s authority to impose economic sanc-
tions against terrorist organizations and their supporters as “the freezing of as-
sets, in and of itself, could not be regarded as inappropriate or disproportionate 
to the fundamental interest in fighting acts of terrorism.”37 But, ruled the court, 
an individual must have the right to be heard—to establish his identity and de-
mand that prosecutors prove his selection for sanctions was justified.38 In Kadi 
II, the court held that the evidence against the petitioners, in the sole possession 
of the Security Council Sanctions Committee, did not satisfy minimal stand-
ards of effective judicial protection against wrongful confiscation of property.39 
The United States Supreme Court invoked similar logic in two leading 
terrorist detention cases: Hamdi40 and Hamdan.41 Justice Thomas dissented in 
each case arguing that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force was 
manifestly broad enough to utilize military commissions in the current conflict 
and that the Court majority was undermining the President’s broad war-making 
powers.42 Justice Stevens wrote in Hamdan that the authorization for the Pres-
ident to convene military commissions in circumstances justified by the Con-
stitution and the law of war did not relieve the Court of its task “to decide 
whether Hamdan’s military commission is so justified.”43 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n (Ka-
di), 2008 E.C.R. I-6351. 
 36 Id. ¶¶ 336–337. The appellate panel ruled that by not communicating to the appellants the evi-
dence against them, the appellants’ rights of defense were not respected. Id. ¶ 348. 
 37 2 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE 
258 (Jonathan L. Black-Branch & Dieter Fleck eds., 2016). 
 38 Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. ¶¶ 336–337. In Joined Cases C-584, C-593 & C-595/10 P, Comm’n v. Kadi 
(Kadi II), 2013 C.M.L.R. 1, the court held that the evidence against the petitioners, in the sole posses-
sion of the Security Council Sanctions Committee, did not satisfy minimal standards of effective judi-
cial protection against wrongful confiscation of property. 2013 C.M.L.R. ¶¶ 135, 138, 139, 150. 
 39 Kadi II, 2013 C.M.L.R. ¶¶ 140–142. 
 40 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 41 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 42 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 680; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 587–88. 
 43 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 559–60. Similarly, Justice O’Connor wrote in Hamdi that the judiciary 
must not defer to the executive branch with respect to detentions. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535–36 (“In-
deed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and focus exclu-
sively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of 
separation of powers.”). For an analysis of the rejection of Justice Thomas’ argument and its applica-
40 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:27 
Most recently, the England and Wales High Court of Justice in Serdar 
Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence held that although the United Kingdom’s 
(U.K.) use of force in Afghanistan was authorized by Security Council resolu-
tions, those resolutions did not specify how detainees were to be treated.44 As-
suming for the sake of argument that the decision to send U.K. troops to Af-
ghanistan as part of ISAF was a Crown act of state not justiciable in the Eng-
lish courts, a decision to detain a particular individual captured by U.K. troops 
in Afghanistan falls into a very different category. It is not necessary to ques-
tion the legality of the decision to send troops in order to judge the legality of 
detention applying Afghan law. The latter does not depend on the former.45 
Going further, Justice Legatt dismissed the entire idea that invoking the princi-
ple of lex specialis could signify the displacement of human rights law, under-
cutting the legal basis for any status-based operations, including targeted kill-
ing.46 
There is important reasoning in all these decisions that defers to the polit-
ical branches on questions about the authorization of the use of military force 
but insists upon judicial review of how individuals are selected for sanction or 
detention. Ironically, although a person’s rights to property and liberty are ju-
dicially recognized and compel judicial intervention in counter-terrorism 
measures that would deprive him of such rights, he may be killed without any 
comparable protection. In this writer’s view, however, a process for selecting 
people to be killed that is insulated from judicial oversight is inherently illegit-
imate. To be consistent with the central premise that a targeted killing is never 
not an act of criminal justice, the judiciary must have a capacity to intervene in 
the selection process. 
Some experts have proposed that an independent executive branch panel 
evaluate whether an individual is an operational leader of an enemy group and 
poses an “imminent” threat; on the basis of that evaluation, the panel would 
offer a non-binding recommendation to the President.47 Whatever might be the 
policy merits of introducing another layer of review onto the executive 
branch’s decision tree, international law would seem to be largely agnostic. A 
process that involves administrative review may be a better national security 
process, but it cannot even begin to satisfy the requirement of criminal justice 
                                                                                                                           
tion to targeted killings, see Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted 
Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 410–11 (2009). 
 44 Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC (QB) 1369 [418] (Eng.). 
 45 Id. at [382]. 
 46 Id. at [274]–[75]. This decision has been strongly criticized for having taken this extra leap. See 
Sean Aughey & Aurel Sari, Targeting and Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict: Serdar 
Mohammed and the Limits of Human Rights Convergence, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 60, 111–13 (2015). 
 47 David Medine & Eliza Sweren-Becker, The United States Needs a Drone Board, DEF. ONE 
(Apr. 23, 2015), www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/04/oversight-targeted-killing-americans-overseas-
new-model/110926/ [https://perma.cc/B4UZ-WZB6]. 
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that available evidence concerning an individual’s culpability be presented to 
an independent judiciary. 
Other experts favor post hoc judicial review of targeted killings based on 
claimed violations of rights.48 In the context of target selection, however, such 
backward-looking judicial review would necessarily focus on how the target 
had been selected. As a result, a claim for judicial review would mean delving 
deep into the core of classified information, raising the full doctrinal barriers 
that stop courts from interceding into matters of national and military security. 
Thus, in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama,49 the District of Columbia District Court refused 
to judge whether an alleged terrorist presented an imminent threat to life or 
physical safety and whether there were any means other than lethal force to 
neutralize the threat; the court ruled that these are precisely the types of com-
plex policy questions traditionally held to be non-justiciable.50 
These objections, however, would apply far less to a specialized court that 
reviews target selections under explicit rules for the conduct of ex parte pro-
ceedings, admissibility and confidentiality of evidentiary submissions, and 
standards for challenging the reliability and credibility of such submissions.51 
Some American experts have advocated engagement of the FISA court to war-
                                                                                                                           
 48 Stephen I. Vladeck, Judicial Review, but Not Secretive Drone Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/24/should-a-court-approve-all-drone-strikes/
judicial-review-but-not-secretive-drone-courts [https://perma.cc/5CD9-AU6J]. This view has been 
shared by human rights groups who do not believe that accountability and transparency will be im-
proved by recent proposals to establish a FISA-like court to sanction lethal targeting operations. See 
Letter from American Civil Liberties Union et al. to Barack Obama, President of the U.S. (Apr. 11, 
2013), https://www.emptywheel.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/130412-Drone-Letter.pdf [https://
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challenge-obama-administrations-targeted-killing-authority-secrecy/ [https://perma.cc/7PAN-46PG]. 
These groups have successfully sought release of redacted documents relating to targeted killings of 
U.S. citizens. New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123 (2nd Cir.), superseded by 
756 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2014). 
 49 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 50 For a discussion of how Anwar al-Aulaqi was targeted during the war on terror despite insuffi-
cient evidence to identify him as a terrorist, see Lesley Wexler, Litigating the Long War on Terror: 
The Role of Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 9 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 159, 164–65 (2011). 
 51 Guiora, supra note 15, at 235, 240. (“Rather than relying on the executive branch making deci-
sions in a ‘closed world’ devoid of oversight and review, the intelligence information justifying the 
proposed action must be submitted to a court that would ascertain the information’s admissibility. . . . 
The standard the court would adopt in determining the information’s reliability is the same applied in 
the traditional criminal law paradigm. The intelligence must be reliable, material, and probative.”) 
Guiora proposes a “strict scrutiny standard [that] would enable operational engagement of a non-state 
actor predicated on intelligence information that would meet admissibility standards akin to a court of 
law.” Id. at 239. Contra James Robertson, Judges Shouldn’t Decide About Drone Strikes, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 15, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/judges-shouldnt-decide-about-
drone-strikes/2013/02/15/8dcd1c46-778c-11e2-aa12-e6cf1d31106b_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/87JL-RG6K]. 
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rant targeted killings as it now warrants surveillance of national security 
threats,52 and there is substantial value in this model in contrast to having the 
normal judiciary undertake this role.53 The process of preparing and submitting 
available intelligence information to a court would compel the executive 
branch to actually meet high standards of evidentiary support for its actions 
and significantly contribute to minimizing operational error that might other-
wise occur. 
The important point here is that as the judiciary should have capacity to 
assess individual culpability deserving of death, there should be a mechanism 
by which the evidence of the suspected target’s culpability may be challenged, 
obviously not by the target, but by a judicial officer responsible for compelling 
proponents of targeting to make each individual case. The purpose of judicial 
intervention in the target selection process is not vindication of any particular 
outcome but to ensure that high evidentiary standards are objectively upheld. 
Moreover, there is a fundamental difference between such review and effects-
based targeting: the latter is entirely prospective, focusing on how elimination 
of an individual might weaken the terrorist organization. By contrast, judicial 
review of an individual’s selection should focus on a different set of questions; 
as to each, the government should bear the burden to establish by the substan-
tial preponderance of evidence that: The individual committed or participated 
in grave crimes causing widespread or terrifying loss of life, for example, he 
has committed acts that substantially manifest his forfeiture of his own right to 
life; and if he has not committed or participated in such grave crimes, there is 
grave risk that he will imminently do so such that law enforcement criteria for 
the use of lethal force (e.g., to save innocent lives) are satisfied. 
Thus, from this writer’s perspective, the purpose of judicial review is less 
to manage the executive branch’s determination of the value of the target in 
terms of destroying the adversary’s fighting capability than it is to compel a 
focus on the target’s criminality rather than his status. Essential to the selection 
of a person for killing is evidence of the individual’s culpability by way of sig-
nificant participation in instigating and executing acts of terrorism. Mere 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See Guiora, supra note 15, at 240. For a discussion of the need for judicial review of drone 
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membership in a prohibited organization, even membership that contributes to 
that organization’s viability, is insufficient. The reason to compel evidence of 
individual culpability is that de-emphasis of such evidence tends to escalated 
killing. With cheaper and more effective technology, this is precisely what has 
happened: the logic of targeted killings as an extraordinary measure is now 
applied routinely and often.54 
C. Part 1 Summation 
As a terrorist is both a criminal and a combatant, a targeted killing is never 
not an act of criminal justice. Therefore, the process for selecting someone for 
targeted killing must entail judicial review, independent of the intelligence and 
military chains of command. To kill someone without that review is to remove 
from legal process the risk of misidentification. The fine distinctions inherent in 
assigning criminal culpability—virtually irrelevant to armed combat and signifi-
cantly shrunk in the process that selects terrorists for killing—are exclusively 
matters for judicial consideration. By contrast, a secretive intelligence-driven 
process of selection taking advantage of remotely operated weapons leads to a 
self-justifying cycle of violence that has killed thousands of people, including 
perhaps more than 200 children. 
Judicial review, in this context, need not impede but should complement 
the pursuit of security and the conduct of counter-terrorism strategies. The 
challenge of handling confidential information and overseeing exceptionally 
sensitive operations is not, in this writer’s view, best assigned to the nation’s 
judiciary as a whole, handling specific selections on a random case-by-case 
basis, but by a specialized tribunal applying explicit procedural and evidentiary 
rules. The purpose of such review is not to re-assess the determination that kill-
ing an individual will weaken a terror network but to ensure that high eviden-
tiary standards are objectively upheld with regard to the individual’s criminal 
responsibility for acts of terrorism. 
                                                                                                                           
 54 As I wrote nearly a quarter century ago: 
Of course, the United States has real security needs, and the military’s response to those 
needs should not be matters for judicial review. But those security needs are not always 
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It is important to acknowledge that targeted killings lists are prepared be-
fore the conduct of a lethal operation.55 The notion that judicial review might 
somehow “delay” a strike is no more valid than the notion that the already 
time-consuming intelligence process for selection might delay an operation. In 
any event, if exigent circumstances arise, a specialized tribunal should certain-
ly be familiar with how to handle such matters on an expedited basis. 
II. THE OBLIGATION TO ARREST 
This Part considers the obligation to arrest suspected terrorists in prefer-
ence to attacking them. This obligation is well accepted. As earlier mentioned, 
the Israeli Supreme Court’s ruling on targeted killing made clear that such kill-
ings may be legally undertaken only when no reasonable means of arrest are 
available.56 Similarly, American CIA Director John Brennan has proclaimed: 
“Our unqualified preference is only to undertake lethal force when we believe 
that capturing the individual is not feasible.”57 
The problem, however, is that the obligation to arrest has little objective 
content; there are no standards to judge whether capturing the individual is 
feasible such that, in any particular case, the use of lethal force may constitute 
a breach of the obligation. The question here is whether states that undertake 
targeted killing programs are, in fact, doing all they can to enable arrests of 
terrorists or are reclining on the ease of drone attacks and subsequently pur-
porting that arrest was infeasible. 
To repeat, the United States has conducted some 800 lethal attacks in 
three countries: Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. It is not clear why, in each of 
these instances, an arrest could not have been reasonably feasible. Absent crite-
ria by which to consistently judge the infeasibility of arrest, the obligation to 
arrest takes on the vacuous logic of tautology: the targeted killing must have 
been the last resort because why else would the victim have been killed? 
The obligation to arrest terrorists should be made of sterner stuff. The the-
sis of this Part is that an international legal analysis of targeted killing must 
assess States’ claims of infeasibility of arrest. The backward-facing accounts of 
intelligence officials may or may not be based on fact, but today it is impossi-
ble to know in any testable sense. My concern here is that armed drones have 
effectively inverted a legal paradigm that should favor arrest. As firing a drone 
missile is relatively easy and certainly safe for the operator, it has become the 
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preferred mechanism for dealing with terrorists unless the feasibility of arrest 
is patent. Even then, the choice of arrest rather than attack is entirely a matter 
for military or intelligence leaders, subject to all of the politics of modern 
counter-terrorism campaigns and certainly never judicially reviewable.58 
The argument proceeds through two sections: Section A assesses the evi-
dentiary burden to establish that arrest is impossible allegedly because the host 
state of the alleged terrorist will not or cannot extradite him for prosecution. 
Section B considers the targeting state’s obligation to use nonlethal force, es-
pecially in light of emerging weapons for incapacitating targets. 
A. Establishing Infeasibility of Arrest 
Arrest means to compel the suspect be brought to criminal justice without 
the use of lethal force except as a last resort necessary to prevent harm to the 
arresting officer or proximate persons; the objective is nonviolent detention 
under judicial oversight. To arrest, law enforcement must overleap myriad sub-
stantive and procedural hurdles established to protect human rights and with 
the full understanding that these hurdles mean that some who are guilty will 
walk free. 
This is a fundamental distinction between law enforcement and the law of 
war: under the law of war, an attacker carries no primary obligation to capture 
rather than kill, especially if to do so would put one’s forces at risk.59 While a 
combatant must respect an adversary’s surrender by doing him no physical 
harm, the onus is on the adversary to plea for quarter; absent any indication of 
an adversary’s intention to accept capture, a combatant has no inherent obliga-
tion to take the adversary into custody rather than kill him.60 If the cause is just 
                                                                                                                           
 58 For a fuller discussion of targeted killings by the United States and Israel and what the legal, 
moral, and strategic implications are, see Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Tar-
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attempt his, her, or their capture, and would not violate the prohibition on assassination.”). 
 60 Id. at 5; see McNeal, supra note 18, at 702–12; Murphy, supra note 43, at 417; see also J.G. 
Fleury, Jus in Bello and Military Necessity (Nov. 17, 1998) (unpublished research essay) (on file with 
Canadian Forces College), https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/260/261/fleury2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y6BT-LR6S]. 
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and the target is legitimate, his elimination is not merely an incident of war but 
a proper tactical objective. 
It would be a fundamental misreading of international law to view arrest 
or attack of terrorists as co-equal alternatives that states may choose between 
in light of particular circumstances. On the contrary, “[h]ost country coopera-
tion in capture and extradition must be the first alternative considered.”61 Unit-
ed Nations Security Council resolutions, anti-terrorism conventions, and a long 
list of pronouncements from international and regional bodies all attest to the 
obligation to bring terrorists to justice.62 At root, the obligation to first arrest 
manifests a deeply respected focus on individual criminal responsibility as op-
posed to collective guilt, rejecting the age-old inclination to blame an entire peo-
ple for the crimes committed by certain individuals who might claim to be 
fighting in the name of the group. Focusing on an individual’s criminal responsi-
bility makes it easier to view his crimes as a disturbance of the peace and, fol-
lowing conviction, for others to accept post-conflict reconciliation and govern-
ance that respects their rights.63 Moreover, arrests initiate a system of impartial 
justice, which builds an objective record of events that is a historical and ulti-
mately transparent account of what happened.64 “Individual accountability for 
massive crimes is an essential part of a preventive strategy and, thus, a realistic 
foundation for a lasting peace.”65 
The obligation first to arrest strives for the elimination of safe havens 
where terrorists can perpetrate crimes untroubled by police. The lesson of Al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan before 2001 is that safe havens for international terror-
ists cannot be tolerated. In operational turns, therefore, states are obligated to 
extradite or prosecute accused terrorists. If State A suspects that a terrorist 
threatening crimes against its citizens or interests is now in the jurisdiction of 
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 62 See UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UNITED NATIONS COUNTER-TERRORISM IMPLE-
MENTATION TASK FORCE, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/un-global-counter-terrorism-
strategy [https://perma.cc/M99E-FN74]. 
 63 As framed by Judge Cassese: 
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break with the past (rompre avec le passé) by punishing those who have deviated from 
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Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches 
of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 2, 10 (1998). 
 64 See Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 12–13 (2001). 
 65 See id. at 10. For a discussion of the need for an international criminal court and the disfavor 
for granting amnesty in the prosecution of international human rights violations, see Michael Scharf, 
The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights 
Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41 (1996). 
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State B, then State A should seek the suspect’s extradition. If the crime is with-
in the scope of anti-terrorism resolutions and conventions, then a request for 
surrender of persons accused of participation in or support of those crimes 
must be binding on all states. 66 A requested state must comply with a request 
for surrender of a suspected terrorist, subject to broadly accepted modalities of 
evidence sharing and of international legal cooperation, either by arresting the 
individual or by showing cause why surrender is improper or unjustifiable.67 
Each state is positively obligated to enact or amend implementing legislation 
so as to facilitate such compliance.68 
The obligation first to arrest means that, with regard to tactics for weak-
ening terrorist networks by disabling their key agents, reasonable options to 
execute an arrest must never go unconsidered. If arrest is an option, then the 
invocation of self-defense to justify a lethal attack must fall. States must not be 
permitted to lethally target persons when arrest is an option. In contrast to the 
law of war, this obligation to arrest before killing is not dependent on the tar-
get’s surrender but on the state claiming a self-defense interest in his incapaci-
tation to show that arrest cannot be accomplished. 
As earlier mentioned, the United States is firmly on record as disinclined 
to use lethal force in the majority of states where law enforcement is coopera-
tive in countering terrorism—a suspect in the jurisdiction of a state willing and 
able to arrest and either prosecute or extradite him will not be lethally targeted. 
By necessary implication, the program of targeted killings in Pakistan, Yemen, 
and Somalia means that there has been and continues to be a negative assess-
ment of these three states’ capacity and willingness to arrest suspected terror-
ists whose whereabouts and identity are concealed and where local antagonism 
to police intrusion may be vehement. This program of targeted killing must 
signify an assessment that it is dangerous to rely on these states’ willingness or 
capacity to bring terrorists to justice; military action is appropriate, therefore, 
in order to combat security threats from international outlaws.69 Thus it has 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Cassese, supra note 63, at 12. Individuals may not be killed on suspicion of membership in a 
group. Rather, authorities must at least make the attempt to arrest a suspect and not simply kill him. 
See Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, at 112, U.N. Doc. 
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published Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow School of Law) (on file with Glasgow Theses Service, 
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 68 See Scharf, supra note 65. 
 69 Kretzmer, supra note 14, at 179 (“The problem with the law-enforcement model in the context 
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been argued, “in those cases where law enforcement measures fall short, one 
can look to a different legal framework.”70 
But the conclusion that law enforcement is ineffectual must not be 
reached impetuously. Ultimately at issue is not the reason for seeking the tar-
get’s incapacitation, but whether it is appropriate to discredit the territorial 
state’s will and capacity for apprehending him. This is a serious accusation 
against a state and deserves to be closely scrutinized. At minimum, the state 
claiming a self-defense imperative for targeting someone in a foreign state 
should be obligated to make a legal finding that arrest and extradition are unre-
alistic in light of the territorial state’s incapacity or unwillingness to participate 
in internationally mandated counter-terrorism measures that demand extradi-
tion of terrorists to states claiming jurisdiction. Even if the state is generally 
uncooperative, has there been a case-specific attempt to gain cooperation? 
Such a determination should require a showing that, for each name on the tar-
geted killing list, all reasonable attempts to gain cooperation, however difficult 
and previously unrewarding, have been exhausted. Such attempts include bi-
lateral diplomacy as well as engagement of international organizations (e.g., 
Interpol) to facilitate legal assistance. 
As a counterpoint, it merits recognition that, in some cases, to exhaust 
law enforcement remedies could entail divulging classified information to the 
territorial state that might enable the suspect to altogether elude being targeted, 
much less arrested. This raises what is perhaps the core issue in the entire de-
bate over targeted killing: May the intelligence and military communities of a 
state, claiming a self-defense need to incapacitate a suspected terrorist, cir-
cumvent the obligation to effectuate legal cooperation with the territorial state 
on the basis of sensitive information that it refuses to divulge? That is, may the 
attacking state obviate the need to pursue international legal process for a ter-
rorist’s extradition because of its national security prerogatives to retain the 
confidentiality of intelligence? 
There is an unavoidable quandary here, as international law provides no 
obviously applicable mechanism or even guidelines about how to answer these 
questions. On the one hand would be to deny a State, especially one that has 
been victimized by global terrorism, the prerogative of defending its citizens 
from an identified harm because modalities of international legal cooperation 
are, as yet, unavailing or diplomatically unrealistic in particular circumstances. 
On the other hand is to perpetuate a cycle of violence on the circular logic that 
these modalities are unavailable because it is not in the state’s national security 
interests to avail themselves of these modalities. Why bother with difficult-to-
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achieve progress in strengthening trans-national legal cooperation for arresting 
suspected terrorists when there is a safe and comparatively easy way of simply 
eradicating them? 
In view of the seriousness of the harm that a targeted killing inflicts not 
exclusively on the target but on proximate communities, the perpetuation of 
violence that targeted killings so obviously signify, and the fact that claims of 
the legality of targeted killings rest on recognition of an exceptional status in 
international law, it would seem incumbent to require that states conducting 
targeted killings engage a capacity for judicial intercession on the question of 
whether attempts to arrest terrorists have been fully exhausted. It is the judici-
ary that can impose strict evidentiary requirements as to whether the executive 
has diligently sought to work with the territorial state, including participation 
in bi- and multilateral efforts to strengthen anti-terrorism legal cooperation as 
the primary means for incapacitating terrorists. It is the judiciary that can ap-
propriately balance the competing interests for transparency and for confiden-
tiality that are inherently at stake. 
In conjunction with the determinations associated with terrorist selection, 
therefore, are determinations associated with whether the territorial state can-
not or will not cooperate in incapacitating the target, rendering arrest infeasi-
ble. For many of the reasons discussed in Part I, it would seem appropriate to 
confine this review to a specialized tribunal with appropriate mandate and ca-
pacities to handle confidential information that would exercise independent 
review outside the military and intelligence chains of command. Put simply, in 
addition to the finding, discussed in Part I, that an individual’s selection for 
targeted killing is justified; a determination that arrest is infeasible must be a 
matter of case-by-case review by an independent judiciary. 
B. Enabling Technological Alternatives for Capture 
If, in fact, arrest of the terrorist by the territorial state is not an available 
option, is the attacking state’s use of force subject only to the constrictions of 
the law of war or does the obligation to first arrest extend to the attacking 
state? Historically, the law of war would prevail. Indeed, the rationale of tar-
geted killing may fairly be encapsulated as: if there is (1) a national self-
defense interest in the terrorist’s elimination from the terrorist network and (2) 
no reasonably available legal assistance by the host state, then the attacking 
state has the right to use lethal force to eliminate the threat. The purpose of this 
section is to take issue with that logic in light of emerging technologies for 
facilitating a target’s incapacitation and thereby arrest. 
In this context, appreciation must be given to the technological revolution 
in armed drones that has transformed targeted killings from the extraordinary 
to the routine, and the comparably significant though less deployed revolution 
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in ordnance that drones can launch. Armed drones are capable of accomplish-
ing military tasks with enviable dexterity and precision and without risk to 
one’s own personnel. An armed drone can go over essentially any terrain using 
its own surveillance system as its guidance and hover undetectably over a tar-
get for lengthy periods. When a target is detected, the drone operator, who may 
be thousands of miles away, can fire a missile with a guidance system that vir-
tually guarantees the target’s destruction. Never before has there been a way to 
deliver lethal force anywhere in the world with such individualized effect. 
A pause for consideration is due for what armed drones will soon become, 
indeed may already be: autonomous weapons. Whatever distinction there may 
be between today’s remotely operated armed drones and tomorrow’s robotic 
weapons is quickly losing real meaning as more aspects of drone operations 
are programmed into the paradigm of decisions available for the device itself 
to make. There is no inherent technological barrier to the prospect of pro-
gramming self-guiding, fast-moving devices that can search out a single indi-
vidual and, when the risk of ancillary harm is low, deliver a lethal attack. 
From a perspective grounded in the international humanitarian law (IHL) 
principle of distinction, today’s armed drones and tomorrow’s robotic weapons 
can reduce violence by offering a far more precise alternative to other forms of 
aerial attack, whether from guided missiles or aircraft. Every other at-distance 
weapon since the invention of artillery has served to destroy blocks of space, 
killing or harming everyone in that space. But emerging weapons’ surveillance 
and precision guidance capabilities enable an attack to be executed far more 
selectively than with cruise missiles or aerial bombers. Thus, these weapons 
offer “a potentially effective way of avoiding broad military deployment while 
still confronting a perceived threat.”71 
At the same time, however, these weapons lower the threshold for claim-
ing “just cause” under jus ad bellum. Critics assert that the persistence and 
range of armed drones enables more attacks in remote areas, causing more—
not fewer—civilian casualties. They allege that, heretofore, military leaders 
might have declined to fire cruise missiles at a target due to an unacceptable 
risk of ancillary casualties, but armed drones’ targeting capability undercuts 
such hesitation.72 Also troubling is the potential for armed drones to spawn 
proliferation of prohibited weapons, especially chem-bio weapons that could 
be effectively delivered by a guidable hovering aircraft equipped for pinpoint 
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warhead delivery; enhanced delivery capacity might be temptation to deploy 
these prohibited weapons.73 
Thus, reliance on increasingly autonomous weapons is said to be a slip-
pery slope to dehumanization of warfare whereby IHL proscriptions against 
inflicting civilian casualties might be ignored by machines incapable of subtly 
assessing complicated battlefield conditions.74 “Drones forestall the threshold 
of last resort for larger military deployment, but that the last resort criterion 
does not apply to drone strikes themselves because the targeted killing of (al-
leged) terrorists becomes the default tactic.”75 
Inherent in an inquiry about the legality of targeted killings is the prospect 
of flotillas of armed drones, and soon robotic weapons, selectively targeting 
individuals with lethal force. Even if the targeted individuals have done horri-
ble crimes, this prospect represents a troubling crossroads in the use of armed 
force and, accordingly, in international law, especially if military and intelli-
gence officials disregard nonlethal alternatives that might have enabled the 
terrorist’s arrest. 76 
The point here is that the technologies used for targeted killing could be 
used for isolating and immobilizing a terrorist suspect, making arrest a practi-
cal alternative to killing. The arrested person, once in custody, would have the 
rights and prerogatives guaranteed to accused felons of comparably horrific 
crimes, and his ultimate fate would similarly be decided pursuant to due pro-
cess of law. The question here—one which has received far too little attention 
from international law experts—is whether emerging weapons technologies 
might raise the potential for a successful arrest, meaning that the use of lethal 
force is not the only option and thus would be contrary to international law. 
It is important in this context to consider the potential for incapacitating 
weapons—so called because they are designed to temporarily impede a target’s 
freedom of movement. There are projectile nettings for ensnaring a target, even 
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a vehicle; electrical pulse weapons can be used to stun the target; directed en-
ergy beams can disable vehicles’ power systems.77 Various foams can stick to a 
target or make traction impossible—in either case, the target cannot move.78 
More controversial are chemical calmatives or disorienting agents that disable 
without inflicting lasting harm.79 There are also darts that can be used to para-
lyze a target. 80 
The military use of incapacitants has sparked recurrent debate among in-
ternational lawyers as has the prospect of autonomous delivery systems to get 
them to their target.81 The issue here is whether these technologies have poten-
tial utility for law enforcement agents to arrest (rather than kill) persons on 
terrorist-targeted killing lists. If, at least in some cases, there is a reasonable 
choice between killing and incapacitating the target, then the law’s interest in 
bringing the culprit to justice must weigh significantly. Of course, operational 
consideration must be given to the risks of arresting personnel or removing an 
incapacitated terrorist from potentially hostile communities or environments; 
that risk can never be as low as the risk to the operator of an armed drone, 
which is what makes targeted killing so attractive. 
But to hypothesize briefly, if a drone identifies a target in a vehicle on a 
desolate road and the drone is equipped not only with explosive missiles but 
incapacitants as well, the tactical implications of extracting the target do not 
seem so obviously herculean as to render arrest undoable. Substantial tactical 
questions of how to execute an arrest using emerging nonlethal weapons are 
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far beyond the scope of this discussion. My more focused objective is to ask 
whether the “virtues” of armed drones—precision, persistence, and range—
offer realistic options to use incapacitants for arrest instead of lethal ordnance 
for killing. 
If such options are realistic, then resort to the use of lethal force may be 
seen as a breach of the obligation to first arrest: even if the use of force is justi-
fied, it may not be necessary and hence not appropriate for the force used to be 
lethal. It would seem difficult for international law to tolerate invocation of the 
law of war so as to disregard nonlethal capacities for arrest. On the contrary, as 
international legal standards stipulate that law enforcers may use lethal force 
only where less lethal options are unavailable or dangerous, 82 and as the tar-
geted killing of a terrorist is never not a law enforcement matter, then rational-
izations for why an arrest may be infeasible must be strictly scrutinized. 
Worth emphasizing here is that the obligation to first arrest should not be 
thought of exclusively in operational terms, but in terms of readiness as well. 
With regard to technologies that can make arrest reasonably feasible, law en-
forcement officials should be trained to plan for and use less-than-lethal 
measures—including restraint, capture, and the graduated use of force. The 
onus should be on the states conducting targeted killings to consider how to 
improve arrest capabilities, including specifying the level of force that can be 
used in various circumstances. 
Put more simply, drones open unimaginable capacities to use smaller, in-
dividually targeted ammunition, e.g., a dart instead of a missile shell. Equipped 
with incapacitating agents rather than explosives, drones could be instruments 
for facilitating arrest instead of exclusively instruments for inflicting lethal 
force. It is not difficult to envision how, if equipped with incapacitants, there 
could be technological capacity for conducting arrests of terrorists, wherever 
they may be, with acceptable risks to allied personnel. Consideration could be 
usefully devoted, therefore, to specifying the circumstances where the use of 
nonlethal force should be prescribed, rendering the use of lethal force inherent-
ly excessive. 
C. Part 2 Summation 
The preference for arresting suspected terrorists instead of attacking them 
is widely acknowledged, and states conducting targeted killings claim to prefer 
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arrest, but there are no objective criteria to assess whether the use of lethal 
force in any particular case is warranted. Statistics on targeted killings suggest 
that military and intelligence leaders often disregard conducting an arrest, and 
this decision is never judicially reviewable. 
It is important to first ask whether the attacking state can avail itself of 
modalities of international legal cooperation to convince the host state where 
the suspected terrorist resides to arrest him. No self-defense rationale based on 
the threat posed by a terrorist would permit a lethal attack in a state where his 
arrest is feasible, and it has never been so argued. With regard to just a few 
states, however, there has been a negative assessment of their capacity and 
willingness to arrest suspected terrorists, and this assessment undergirds states’ 
targeted killings programs. But this assessment has not been subject to judicial 
review, certainly not on a case-by-case basis. The concern here is with an insti-
tutional instinct to resort to lethal force when an enemy can be eliminated in-
stead of engaging the one branch of government highly trained in evaluating 
capacities for executing legal process: the judiciary. 
Thus, while a state may protect itself from a terrorist located in a state 
that will not or cannot arrest him, the targeting state should still respect the 
obligation to first arrest, especially if there are technologies that can make an 
arrest, instead of a lethal strike, potentially feasible. The substantial advances 
in drone technology, moving rapidly toward development of autonomous sys-
tems for delivering ordnance of whatever type, along with substantial advances 
in incapacitants, suggest that the constraints on law enforcement’s weapons, 
tactics, and training should apply in connection with targeted killings. Whatev-
er justifications there may be for the use of force, states that have the military 
wherewithal to conduct programs of targeted killings should be required to 
develop and use nonlethal targeting and apprehension technologies. 
Altogether, the target’s “arrest-ability” is a matter that should be judicially 
reviewable. The problem with an approach based on the law of war is that the 
key questions concerning the obligation to first arrest—whether the host state 
can be relied upon, or whether a nonlethal capture can be executed—are now 
answered by executive branch officials, not by judges. Their answers may be 
irreproachable in many cases, but the number of targeted killings would advise 
engagement of judicial officials who, in every legal system, are responsible for 
supervising the conduct and conditions of arresting criminals. 
III. MANDATORY INVESTIGATION OF TARGETED KILLINGS  
OF INNOCENT CASUALTIES 
This Part considers the legal implications of killing someone who was in 
no meaningful sense selected for killing nor was a combatant-affiliate of the 
target but was an innocent either mistaken for a target or simply in the wrong 
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place at the wrong time. It is in this context that the starkest distinction be-
tween the law of criminal justice and the law of war appears. 
In the law of war, because targets are not selected based on their moral 
turpitude but rather for their significance to the enemy’s war-fighting capabil-
ity, killing someone who is proximate to the enemy’s material assets is not 
murder if the attack satisfies IHL requirements of military necessity and pro-
portionality. This precept evolved in the context of state-versus-state warfare, 
which focused substantial attention on territory and so little on individual re-
sponsibility. Even though a civilian in or near valid military targets might not 
deserve to be personally targetable, circumstances might justify her death as an 
incident of war.83 But as earlier asserted, this paradigm unrealistically de-
scribes today’s targeted killing of terrorists outside battlefield theatres. 
To repeat a central refrain: targeted killings are remarkably personal, fo-
cused on individual responsibility for crimes past and future. The individual’s 
killing is not based on any concept of nationality, much less of territory. Tar-
geted killings are enabled by technology that renders successful execution eas-
ier than it has ever been before and without geographic limitation. Properly 
viewed, the very logic of targeted killing undermines the logic of tolerating 
harm to innocent casualties; there is no reason to view the killing of proximate 
but innocent persons as reasonable collateral damage. If there is a death of a 
child, a geriatric, or someone incapable of posing any type of threat, any con-
tention that this is an unfortunate incident of lawful warfare makes no sense in 
view of how targeted killings have changed combat. 
The United States under the Obama Administration announced commit-
ment to the idea that their targeted killings should not entail collateral harm to 
innocent persons.84 But, as earlier noted, the Bureau of Investigative Journal-
ism reports that targeted killings by drones outside battlefield theaters are re-
sponsible for between 620 and 1316 civilians, of which more than 200 have 
been children.85 Most targeted killings occur in isolated regions because that is 
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where terrorists tend to be. Whatever innocent casualties may have occurred, a 
lack of internet access combined with traditional communities’ deeply held 
notions of privacy complicate access to information. To repeat, as governments 
hold the best evidence of innocent casualties, refusals to reveal that infor-
mation stymie refutation of assertions that there have been no innocent casual-
ties. But that does not mean, of course, that these assertions are true. 
The central point here is that, in today’s international law, only targeted 
killings sustain the proposition that States may kill innocent people without 
accountability. In no other context would this proposition be even remotely 
accepted. Here, the relics of the law of war sustain a legal shield around target-
ed killing because it is said that, in war, sometimes innocent people must die. 
International law, if it is to stand for anything, must postulate that to cause 
the death of someone not suspected of being a terrorist is, necessarily, a homi-
cide, and a state that causes innocent casualties must be held accountable. It 
may not be a war crime; it may not even be premeditated murder. But the use 
of lethal force can never be an act for which legal responsibility is ignorable. It 
is by definition tortious and must give rise to a legal inquiry and, if the facts 
warrant, imposition of legal consequences, whether civil or criminal. 
Section A of this Part recounts how claims of innocent casualties from 
targeted killings have fared before various national courts. Section B frames 
such claims as raising fundamental issues of the right to truth. 
A. Doctrinal Quasi-Impunity 
This section recounts how and why courts in both Europe and the United 
States, with only rare exceptions, have established doctrinal barriers to civil 
accountability for wrongful death or injury due to targeted killings by denying 
access to judicial process. Judicial determination of fault based on a thorough 
and adversarial investigation is obviated by these doctrinal barriers. As a result, 
the victim’s family, nor anyone else, can challenge the reason for the loss. In 
this writer’s view, the cumulative effect of no judicial accountability for inno-
cent casualties constitutes a gaping hole in the operation of international law. 
Perhaps the barrier most litigated has been jurisdictional: whether the 
consequences of the use of force in foreign lands are within the jurisdictional 
scope of the acting state’s courts. For example, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom86 
concerned claims for the deaths of claimants’ civilian relatives from drone 
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strikes.87 Claimants invoked the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(ECHR) protections of life.88 But the injury was inflicted in a place outside the 
ECHR’s jurisdiction, and the victims were nationals of states not party to the 
Convention.89 In the court’s view, jurisdiction was essentially territorial; that 
an act committed by a contracting state or its agents caused harm to an indi-
vidual did not establish that the individual was within that state’s jurisdiction.90 
To hold otherwise would open the floodgates of litigation to every individual 
against whom force was used, compelling the judiciary to micromanage mili-
tary activities which courts lack the necessary evidence and competence to 
judge.91 The ECtHR overturned the U.K. House of Lords’ dismissal of the 
claims, but only on the exceptional ground that acts of states occurring or pro-
ducing effects outside their territories can constitute exercises of jurisdiction if 
agents of the state exercise authority over an individual.92 Because the U.K. 
exercised some public powers in the occupied city of Basrah, it was obliged to 
officially investigate the deaths.93 Nothing in the opinion, however, suggested 
that killing is, in and of itself, authority or control, especially if the state is 
merely firing missiles from an aircraft.94 
The notion of a court not having jurisdiction over foreigners’ claims based 
on homicides allegedly committed by its state is puzzling, as it seems to negate 
the active personality theory of jurisdiction and suggest that states may do to 
foreigners with impunity what they would not be allowed to do their own citi-
zens, as if every man’s inalienable rights to life and liberty were territorially 
delimited, as if their creator endowed those rights using a partially filled-in 
map where only nationals of certain states could complain of wrongful death. 
The ECtHR had to find the U.K.’s authority in Basrah to be an exception on 
which to order an investigation of the plaintiffs’ relatives’ deaths and was 
compelled to acknowledge that the shooting of the missile was not, in and of 
itself, the exercise of jurisdiction over the victims. It is troubling that state ac-
tion of such palpable significance to a private person in another state is juris-
dictionally barred by the courts of the acting state. 
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Doctrinally distinguishable but to similar effect are recent decisions in-
volving U.S. drone strikes but filed in other states’ courts. In Khan v. Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,95 the defendant allegedly pro-
vided locational intelligence for the drone strike that killed forty people, in-
cluding claimant’s father.96 Claimant argued that turning over such infor-
mation, foreseeing a serious risk that the information would be used to kill 
someone, should render the passer liable for aiding and abetting murder.97 But 
the court refused to forbid the secretary to pass such information, holding that 
to pursue the claim would put the court in the position of judging the discre-
tionary acts of a sovereign state.98 
From an international law perspective, the disinclination of the courts of 
one nation to review another state’s use of force is easily understood: questions 
about the host state’s aiding and abetting that use of force would tread heavily 
on respected concepts of sovereign immunity. But such disinclination is less 
relevant if the claim of wrongful death is brought in the state that committed the 
attack. This is why the recently filed complaint, Bin Ali Jabar Families v. United 
States, deserves attention.99 Allegedly, a drone strike killed innocent bystanders 
and thus violated the Torture Victim Prevention Act.100 Claimants do not seek 
monetary damages nor injunctive relief but only an official apology.101 
B. The Right to Truth 
The purpose of this section is to assert that international law propounds a 
right to truth and that unaccountable innocent casualties of targeted killings 
violate this right. Increasingly recognized by international tribunals,102 the 
right to truth is inherently entwined with principles of accountability, obligat-
ing states to enable analysis of their actions that pertain to the human right to 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Khan v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2014] EWCA (Civ) 24. 
 96 See id. at [1]–[3]. 
 97 Id. at [4]. 
 98 See id. at [29]. 
 99 Complaint, Jaber v. United States, No. 15-0840 (D.D.C. July 6, 2015), https://
www.reprieve.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2015_06_07-PUB-Jaber-v.-United-States-et-al-
Complaint-Filed.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG22-SXDT]; see Scott Shane, Families of Drone Strike Vic-
tims in Yemen File Suit in Washington, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/06/
09/world/middleeast/families-of-drone-strike-victims-in-yemen-file-suit-in-washington.html?_r=2 
[https://perma.cc/TV55-MSRM]. Complainant’s suit against German authorities for having allowed 
U.S. forces to use its air base to conduct drone attacks was dismissed, and the court held that “the 
German government is not obliged to prevent the United States from using the air base in Ramstein 
for executing drone strikes in Yemen.” Ryan Devereaux, German Court Turns Down Drone Lawsuit 
but Leaves Door Open to Others, INTERCEPT (May 30, 2015), https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/
05/30/german-court-turns-drone-lawsuit-leaves-door-open-others/ [https://perma.cc/89LJ-6HSV]. 
 100 Complaint, supra note 100, paras. 1, 12; Shane, supra note 100. 
 101 Complaint, supra note 100, para. 22; Shane, supra note 100; Devereaux, supra note 99. 
 102 See Al Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 292 (2014), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-146044 [https://perma.cc/G2MV-8D46]. 
2017] Targeted Killing 59 
life. When a state is implicated in a use of force causing death or grave injury, 
the right to truth compels not only clarification of how the harm was inflicted, 
but also of the general context, the policies and institutional failures and deci-
sions that enabled that harm.103 The right to truth signifies a negation of impuni-
ty claims; no one may be absolved of legal responsibility when innocent lives 
are lost.104 If the facts warrant, culpable parties including government officials 
should be prosecuted (or extradited).105 
States should have a legislative framework in place for conducting inves-
tigations of serious allegations of fundamental human rights violations, even if 
no prima facie indication of illegality is shown.106 The duty to investigate is 
owed simultaneously to the particular victims and to the society at large—to 
rectify whatever the harm, punish the perpetrators, and deter further wrongful 
behavior.107 Investigations have the further virtue of helping to identify organi-
zational and procedural deficiencies that may have allowed the violation. 
Even if there is a strong state interest in maintaining the secrecy of infor-
mation, the difficulties that this causes should be counterbalanced so as to al-
low legal interests to be effectively defended.108 The converse proposition is 
important here: negative inferences may be drawn from the absence of such 
capacities or their ineffectiveness in any particular case. That is, the right to 
truth posits that a state’s failure to inquire as to serious allegations of breach of 
significant obligations, or its interference with such inquiries, raises, in and of 
itself, inferences of non-compliance.109 
Investigations should be: (1) effective, (2) independent, and (3) reasona-
bly transparent both as to process and result.110 Effectiveness is not an obliga-
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tion of result, but of means.111 Authorities should take reasonable steps to se-
cure the evidence concerning the loss of life; any deficiency in the investiga-
tion that undermines ability to establish the cause of death or the person(s) re-
sponsible will risk falling foul of this standard.112 It is important that authori-
ties investigate promptly to prevent any appearance of collusion or tolerance of 
unlawful acts.113 A slow investigative process may be ineffective in identifying 
past violations due to the loss of evidence and fading memory. 
Because an investigation should genuinely strive to ascertain the truth and 
hold wrongdoers accountable, the persons responsible for carrying out the in-
vestigation should be independent from those implicated in the events.114 Some 
commentators advocate entrusting investigative tasks to permanent investiga-
tive bodies—a mechanism used in other human rights contexts—invested with 
powers to require witnesses to appear before them, to receive documents, and 
to gather information.115 Permanent investigative bodies have the virtue of be-
ing able to accumulate considerable expertise in handling problems and can 
thereby improve the effectiveness of investigations over time.116 
Transparency ensures that the beneficiaries of the right to truth—the vic-
tim’s representatives and the general public—have their interests safeguard-
ed.117 At minimum, relevant information should be sufficiently disclosed to 
allow the victim’s family to fully participate in the investigation.118 Claims by 
state officials that certain information could not be disclosed to the alleged vic-
tim and the public on national security or related grounds should be reviewed 
by some entity outside the chain of command. Investigators (or courts) should 
have ultimate authority to decide what information should or should not be 
published. Where information is withheld, there should be a way for persons 
appointed to act in the victim’s interests to test official assurances and defens-
es. Again, a standing investigatory body offers the advantage of systematically 
balancing tension between the military need for secrecy and the principle of 
public scrutiny. 
The right to truth offers a straightforward approach to innocent casualties 
of targeted killings. Any state that would undertake a program of targeted kill-
ings should, according to the right to truth, have in place a capacity for effec-
tive, independent, and transparent investigation of claims of innocent casual-
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ties. International law would not prescribe the specific procedures of such con-
sideration—indeed, each state must have procedures that reflect and comport 
with its constitutional system. Yet, international law has an abiding interest in 
ensuring that any innocent person who is directly and substantially harmed by 
a foreign state has a remedy against that state, and any state that would deny 
such remedy is, necessarily, violating international law. 
Key here is the difference between claims of innocent casualties and the 
earlier discussed rights of persons selected for targeted killing. A challenge to 
being selected for targeted killing necessarily would require that a court delve 
into military and intelligence decisions exclusively within the prerogatives of 
the executive branch, raising risks of disclosure of government secrets. If in-
deed there is a process of judicial intercession in the selection process as earli-
er discussed in Part I—if the victim’s rights were, in effect, addressed in a pro-
cess that respects the criminal justice implications of a targeted killing—then 
post hoc judicial review risks precisely the intrusion that worries critics of a 
judicial role. 
But a victim who was not selected for targeting lost rights that were not 
protected in the selection process. Whether the law of war might allow the 
strike against someone else is essentially irrelevant to what happened to the 
claimants who were innocent casualties. As there was no decision that targeted 
the claimants, there is no decision to review. Because the military (or intelli-
gence) considerations that underlay the decision to attack are not central to 
why a different innocent person was killed, much less the policy for using 
force in general, post hoc investigation and legal accountability are not threat-
ening to that process, and there is no acceptable alternative to rectify the loss to 
the injured party and to ensure that there is a legal record of that loss and how 
it was caused. 
CONCLUSION 
This essay has argued that targeted killings may be legal only if the at-
tacking state: (1) selects individuals pursuant to a process that includes judicial 
intercession for determination of their past or future crimes; (2) establishes that 
arrest is impossible both because the host state is unwilling or unable to exe-
cute an arrest request and that emerging nonlethal capacities for incapacitating 
the individual have been thoroughly considered but are likely to be ineffective; 
and (3) is legally accountable under the right to truth for innocent casualties of 
targeted killing operations. 
Readers may be dismissive that this is but one writer’s wish list, a com-
pendium perhaps of what international law should be but not a dispassionate 
portrayal of what it actually stipulates. This is a fair critique. But it is also a 
circular critique: the best defense of current targeted killings policy is that it 
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violates no strict and certain prohibition of international law, but the propo-
nents of this defense have done little to clarify applicable international law. My 
analysis may be said to be more aspirational than descriptive because targeted 
killing operations are alleged to operate in a black hole of international law, but 
in fact it is a hole that relevant decision makers have themselves not filled in—
the hole’s persistence serves targeted killings well because the perpetrators do 
little to demand better international law. It is the ultimate manifestation of the 
Lotus logic that what is not prohibited to states is necessarily allowed, invoked 
by states to allow their military and intelligence communities to do as they 
deem best. 
Such circular logic resulting in no effective legal control of the killing of 
thousands of people is, in this writer’s view, a cynical manipulation of interna-
tional law’s interstices, offering self-perpetuating ambiguity about how to op-
erate in these interstices as permission to take lives. Looming is the slippery 
slope of such logic: with technology that enables detection, identification, and 
elimination of persons deemed to pose a terror threat, security can be pursued 
under a veil of unaccountability. Tomorrow, perhaps, we may all be saved from 
the dangers of terrorists and other horrific villains with the mere push of a ro-
botic button and without the complexities of criminal justice. Such a world, 
even if momentarily more secure, would not deserve to be called more respect-
ful of international law. 
Ours is a moment to advocate the international legal imperative that every 
loss of life must be governed by fundamental principles of criminal justice. 
